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The Council of Councils Third Annual Conference gathered forty participants from twenty countries to discuss global efforts to confront the world's most daunting challenges. The conference focused on six pressing issues of international cooperation: humanitarian intervention since Rwanda, the future of Internet governance, global financial regulation, the role of international institutions in climate change, emerging global health challenges, and the proliferation of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Participants also gleaned insight from keynote addresses by U.S. and international leaders including Thomas E. Donilon, former national security adviser to President Barack Obama; Jan Eliasson, deputy secretary-general of the United Nations; and Christine M. Cumming, first vice president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.

Adapting Global Governance to Emerging Challenges

Events between May 2013 and May 2014 reinforced the fact that current multilateral frameworks are straining to address the new challenges posed by deepening global interdependence and the opportunities it presents. For instance, laudable international efforts to stem nuclear proliferation resulted in the joint plan of action in Iran—the best hope in years of bringing the unpredictable country's nuclear program under international regulation. However, the nuclear nonproliferation regime failed to constrain the continuing nuclear development of India, Pakistan, and China, or to make progress on disarmament negotiations with the volatile government of North Korea. As participants considered global governance developments and shortfalls throughout the conference, three major trends emerged that highlight international efforts' shift to address common challenges. These trends illustrate why existing international institutions should adapt their strategic outlooks to accommodate emerging powers, incorporate new frameworks for multilateral action, and keep up with rapid technological changes.

First, great power politics have returned. After a decade in which multilateral action largely focused on containing nontraditional security threats, especially transnational terrorism and intrastate warfare, there has

been a resurgence of geopolitical crises involving great powers. In Ukraine, Russia and the United States are at loggerheads over issues of sovereignty and political systems. In Asia, China's assertiveness in the East and South China Seas, along with responses from neighbors, has put the region on edge. These tensions have demonstrated that traditional power competition persists alongside joint management of economic interdependence. It is important for countries and international institutions to understand how these countercurrents of rivalry and cooperation are likely to play out and how to balance them in the global governance arena.

Second, countries are grappling with how best to pursue multilateral cooperation in a world of complex problems ranging from Internet governance to international trade. There are frequent trade-offs between seeking comprehensive agreements and institutions, on the one hand, and disaggregated, sector-specific agreements, on the other. Multilateral cooperation should strike the right balance among formal, universal-membership forums, minilateral arrangements among smaller groups of nations, and at other times, as in humanitarian intervention and peacekeeping, agreements between regional and subregional bodies. When it comes to mitigating climate change and adapting to its effects, for example, universal arrangements like the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change have fallen far short of what is needed to curb emissions and promote low carbon development. It is clear that arresting climate change will depend not only on countries' accession to a post-Kyoto agreement in 2015, but also on a combination of regional and minilateral initiatives, "bottom-up" approaches, and domestic legislation.

Finally, the role of technology is increasingly driving global governance to adapt to new realities, while threatening to outpace capacity to craft and implement necessary and effective governance mechanisms. Whether it is the rise of synthetic biology and the risks this poses to biosecurity; increasingly complex derivatives and high-frequency trading in global finance; or continuing advances in drone technology and the spread of these weapons to new state and nonstate actors, these scientific and technological advances are creating new risks, threats, and externalities that demand new forms of global governance. This dilemma is playing out in the cyber arena, where the Internet has rapidly become integrated into virtually every facet of human life. But as the Internet advances, so too do the vulnerabilities it poses to individuals and states. In the face of these threats, policymakers around the world are challenged with fashioning innovative governance structures that mitigate the risks while maintaining the Internet's open governance model. However, there is no international consensus on how to do this or even which states or nonstate actors should take the lead.

Session One

Humanitarian Intervention Since Rwanda

Humanitarian intervention—or forcible intervention into a sovereign state to protect lives—has been a recurrent subject of international debate since 1994 with the genocide in Rwanda. Between April and July of that year, some eight hundred thousand Tutsi and moderate Hutu men, women, and children were systematically killed by ethnic Hutus, as the world stood immobile. As Kofi Annan put it, "In their greatest hour of need, the world failed the people of Rwanda." On the twentieth anniversary of this atrocity, the world is still plagued by mass atrocities, including in Sudan, Syria, and the Central African Republic.

Rwanda focused international attention on the debate over when and how the world should respond to mass atrocity crimes, including genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. A decade later, at the UN World Summit of 2005, UN member states unanimously endorsed the norm of the "responsibility to protect" (R2P). That principle reframed sovereignty as responsibility: the responsibility to protect citizens from mass-atrocity crimes. When a state cannot discharge that obligation or makes war on its people, that responsibility falls on the rest of the world to protect that state's population, including through armed intervention authorized by the UN Security Council (UNSC).

However, participants acknowledged that multilateralism in the twenty-first century is increasingly disaggregated and there is no consensus regarding where, when, or even if humanitarian interventions should

take place. While there is little contention regarding the core norm of protecting individuals from mass atrocities, major powers—established and emerging—continue to debate the circumstances under which military force may be used against another state in advance of these aims. Both Russia and China, as well as a number of developing countries have expressed increased distrust about the motivations of Western interventions primarily conducted in developing nations. This came to a head in the aftermath of the R2P intervention in Libya in 2011, which many now see as the high watermark of the R2P norm. Participants discussed why, after the 2011 intervention, many states considered Libya to be violating the spirit of R2P, with some pointing to Western decisions to use UNSC authorization for a “humanitarian” mission as cover for removing Muammar al-Qaddafi from power.

In the wake of emerging powers’ concern over the intervention in Libya, one participant pointed to Brazil’s attempt to reconcile developing and developed countries’ attitudes toward legitimate cases of mass atrocities by introducing the concept of “responsibility while protecting” (RwP) to the UN General Assembly in November 2011. RwP is a normative concept that seeks to rein in R2P by stressing accountability, assessment, and prevention over military intervention, and seeks to enforce accountability for those nations that use force pursuant to a UNSC resolution. Though Brazil envisioned RwP as a bridge to connect emerging states in discussion about humanitarian intervention, it has failed to gain much diplomatic traction and has been greeted skeptically by the UNSC permanent members.

Participants also considered the role of regional and subregional institutions in humanitarian intervention. Though their role will surely grow, most regional and subregional institutions currently lack the capacity necessary to mount successful R2P interventions, which will continue to rely on the capabilities of established powers. At the same time, participants noted a dwindling official and public appetite for intervention on the part of the United States and other Western countries. The gap between U.S. rhetoric and action was nowhere more apparent than in the war in Syria—where the United States and the rest of the world have failed to act decisively despite mass atrocities. This leadership gap is dangerous, one participant cautioned, because it encourages malicious actors to conduct mass atrocities. Another participant countered that the hesitation of developed nations to mount additional interventions has more to do with the fact that, as recent history indicates, the use of military force does not solve the humanitarian crisis. In addition, Western countries appear to be more concerned with the lack of feasible exit strategies rather than with the reasons to go in the first place.

Finally, the return of great power politics has had a significant effect on the lack of implementation of the R2P norm. The geopolitical interests of established and emerging powers clearly influence where humanitarian interventions take place. For instance, the North Korean government is widely known to commit institutionalized crimes against humanity, and one participant questioned the role that China’s and Russia’s relations with the totalitarian dictatorship have played in the West’s decision not to mount a humanitarian intervention into the country. Participants also pointed to the divergent national interests of the Security Council’s P5 countries (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) as a leading factor in the hesitation to intervene in Syria, despite the fact that the mounting violence has now displaced two-fifths of the population. Participants also discussed what might happen if intervention is mounted by major powers for allegedly “humanitarian” reasons that do not resonate with Western countries. As a recent example, they pointed to Russian president Vladimir Putin’s invocation of the language of R2P to justify Russia’s ongoing intervention in neighboring Ukraine. As great power politics increasingly reemerge, the lack of consent surrounding humanitarian interventions will only serve to decrease international action in the cases that need it most.

Session Two

The Future of Internet Governance

On the heels of Global Multistakeholder Meeting on the Future of Internet Governance (NETmundial) in April 2014 and the ongoing controversy surrounding U.S. mass surveillance that first erupted in 2013, Internet

governance has risen to the top of the global governance agenda. The Internet, which one participant called “the nervous system of the international system,” now connects nearly three billion people. As the Internet increasingly crosses into almost every arena of modern life (one participant noted that around one trillion devices are now controlled via the Internet), its governance has become both necessary and inevitable. The question now is whether the Internet will remain under a decentralized multi-stakeholder system of governance in which nonstate actors and state actors have equal say in assigning IP addresses, determining content pricing, and data flow between countries. Or, alternatively, perhaps the current open governance model will be succeeded by state efforts to reterritorialize the Internet under traditional domestic regulatory systems.

The Internet is currently governed by a network of actors, including civil society, private sector, governments, academia, domestic nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and international NGOs. One of the Internet’s only formal governance institutions is the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), a nonprofit organization that ensures stability and security of the Internet’s global domain name system. The Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) is the department of ICANN responsible for coordinating domain name system (DNS) roots, autonomous system (AS) numbers, and Internet protocol (IP) assignments. Participants discussed the problems raised by the fact that IANA operates under a contract to the U.S. Department of Commerce (DoC), which implies to many around the world that one country is controlling this global resource. In March 2014, the DoC did announce plans to hand over stewardship of IANA to ICANN, but this raises a whole new host of issues. Some experts question the capacity of ICANN to effectively support and run this global system, as well as the legality of giving an NGO the power to make decisions and set rules with such sweeping international consequences. At the same time, changing the actual process of how DNS roots, AS numbers, and IP addresses are assigned might affect people’s ability to set up and access websites as freely as they do today.

The Snowden revelations in 2013 exposed mass digital surveillance by the United States, causing harsh international criticism and a decline in the perceived legitimacy of existing Internet governance structures. This has created a vacuum of leadership and increasing disagreement among countries about how the Internet should be governed. Participants discussed the relevance and outcomes of the recent April 2014 Global Multistakeholder Meeting on the Future of Internet Governance, which was scheduled by the government of Brazil in the wake of the Snowden revelations. Participants noted that some states used the opportunity to call for tighter domestic regulation of the Internet. One participant noted, however, that the NETmundial outcome document insisted on consensus-based decision-making among private sector companies, civil society, governments, and NGOs involved in the Internet; stated that ICANN should come fully under international control by 2015; and called for additional funding for the UN Internet Governance Forum. Some participants argued Russia’s and Cuba’s rejection of the outcome document weakened its effectiveness, but others argued that it represents the first step toward ensuring the Internet remains free by formally instituting a multi-stakeholder system of governance.

Participants also discussed how the Snowden revelations have changed the political landscape of Internet negotiations, noting that, as U.S. influence declines in the cyber arena, emerging economies like Brazil are assuming the lead in conversations about Internet freedom and governance. That said, participants also acknowledged that emerging and developing countries are not speaking with one voice; the countries still disagree about how the Internet should be and could be governed. One participant noted that the Snowden revelations initially resulted in weakened support for the ICANN multi-stakeholder model, but by May of 2014 much of that initial backlash had subsided. Participants pointed to fragmentation on issues such as privacy and surveillance questions (Who has data and where is it stored? What can they do with it?), as well as which actors should be involved in developing Internet regulations. Meanwhile, many developing and emerging nations have expressed concern that they will be left out of the process due to the so-called digital divide—only 31 percent of Internet users are in developing countries.

The Snowden controversy also raised questions about security. Some participants argued that more heavy-handed national Internet policies may be inevitable as the Internet becomes a matter of national security. One

participant recognized that issues falling under the purview of national governments, like health care and trade, are increasingly integrated with online systems and necessitate individual governments' improved cyberspace governance. Others argued that more reliance on the international architecture of the Internet will instead result in greater international cooperation.

Session Three

Governing Global Finance: Recent Progress, Remaining Gaps

The 2008 financial crisis exposed the risks posed by an unfettered and interdependent global financial system. As the first global economic crisis to originate in a developed economy since the 1920s, the global financial crisis (GFC) of 2008 has forced international, regional, and national actors to reexamine and reform the rules and regulations that govern the banking sector. Significant progress has been made to rein in the financial sector, but major gaps continue to pose a systemic threat to economies around the world.

Participants outlined areas of progress in improving regulation at various levels of governance. At the multilateral level, the Group of Twenty's (G20) Global Multistakeholder Meeting on the Future of Internet Governance and the Financial Stability Board (FSB) became the primary institutions working to address global financial governance. Under the oversight of these institutions, several new standards have been established to reduce the volatility of the banking industry. The most prominent of these standards, Basel III, is a set of global, voluntary accords that limit the risk banks can assume by placing requirements on their capital, leverage ratio, and liquidity. However, participants noted that the G20's legitimacy has been called into question because it fails to include many economically important countries. At the regional level, the European Union has adopted a new set of banking norms and regulations and Asian countries considerably strengthened their regional safety net. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act in the United States and the Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013 in the United Kingdom are primary examples of major regulatory actions taken by national governments.

However, participants also noted the costs associated with increased regulation and the potential tradeoff between economic growth and financial stability. Some participants complained about the undue costs placed on the banking sectors of developing economies by Basel III in response to problems arising from financial markets in developed economies. Other participants observed that, as a result of the crisis, investors have preferred short-term investments over long-term infrastructural investments that are necessary to promote sustained growth and development in emerging markets.

Despite significant progress in the area of banking regulation, participants noted that three major regulatory gaps continue to pose a threat to international financial stability: the problem of banks that are "too big to fail," the growing shadow banking sector, and under-regulated derivatives markets. Each of these areas requires that national policies coordinate closely to avoid financial and regulatory arbitrage.

Recent experience has also underscored the importance of greater macroeconomic coordination, given the potentially global effects of domestic policy decisions. For example, the U.S. tapering of quantitative easing—a monetary policy aimed at lowering interest rates and increasing money supply through the purchase of securities by a central bank—injects high levels of uncertainty into emerging markets, increasing volatility and threatening the markets' growth. Participants called for greater macroeconomic coordination among countries to improve global economic stability. Some suggested that perhaps the IMF should take on a greater role in holding countries accountable for their macroeconomic policies, while others questioned the future role of the dollar as a global medium of exchange, given the spillover effects on the policies of the U.S. Federal Reserve.

The greatest risk is complacency, noted one participant. Six years ago there was an acute sense of urgency that allowed government officials to push through many reforms. However, now that financial markets have been

stabilized—and no longer pose an immediate threat—there is a risk that these reforms could be slowed down or potentially reversed.

Session Four

Emerging Global Health Challenges: Biosecurity, Infectious Diseases, and Noncommunicable Diseases

Aside from the World Health Organization (WHO), few international instruments exist to regulate global health. The WHO operates under two major legal instruments. The first is the original 1948 charter, which obligates each member state to achieve the “highest attainable standard of health” by implementing and upholding the regulations laid out in the charter and all subsequent WHO conventions and agreements. However, the charter, drafted at the dawn of the Cold War, failed to include enforcement capacity and weakly addressed controversial issues. For instance, Cold War politics forced the WHO to divide the world into six broadly defined and autonomous regional offices so that the Soviet Union and the United States could each have spheres of influence. As a result, the charter did not address health issues that did not strictly apply to specific regions and how to categorize countries that could be grouped with multiple regions. The second major legal instrument, the International Health Regulations (IHR), was passed in 2005 and went into effect in 2010. Like the charter, the IHR assumes that nation-states will take responsibility for responding to disease outbreaks, yet infectious microbes are not constrained by borders.

Participants discussed the recent shortcomings of the WHO, namely budget cuts and the failure of 80 percent of countries to meet the IHR standards. For 2014–2015, the budget for rapid responses to infectious diseases was cut in half. The WHO said that it would rely on nations to support efforts to combat potential outbreaks. However, communicable diseases can easily spread across regions, which makes state-specific action (as suggested by the WHO), incomplete at best. In addition, only forty countries have implemented the IHR requirements. Participants noted, however, that in February 2014, the United States and twenty-six other countries established the Global Health Security Agenda to help WHO member countries achieve the IHR goals.

Within the context of weak governance over public health issues, participants discussed the recent outbreaks of new and dangerous infectious diseases as well as growing concerns posed by noncommunicable diseases (NCDs). The recent outbreak of the Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS) in Saudi Arabia highlights the potential for a local infection to become a global epidemic. As of May 2014, four pilgrims had taken MERS home to their host countries and the United States had announced its second case.

Participants also discussed the continued prevalence of HIV/AIDS in Africa as a major global health issue. As a result of this catastrophic epidemic, life expectancies have plummeted to about forty years in some African countries or less than half the life expectancy in Japan. Meanwhile, donors such as the United States are essential to saving the lives of many individuals in poor and middle-income countries. The HIV/AIDS epidemic also illustrated the political and cultural facets of global health, as stigmas, misnomers, and myths continue to inhibit prevention, reporting, and treatment efforts.

Though infectious diseases pose a global threat, their treatment does not promise global benefit. The risk of contracting a deadly infectious disease may be distributed equally across the globe, but access to vaccination, prevention, and other tools to combat diseases remains profoundly unequal. For example, as the H1N1 virus spread across the globe in 2009, developed nations hoarded vaccines even after the virus had run its course locally. Their disregard for other nations during the crisis demonstrated a troubling lack of global cooperation. In the case of MERS, one Dutch research lab has patented the virus, slowing down research on a growing threat. Given this behavior, developing nations may perceive little incentive to report outbreaks of new diseases to international health authorities.

Treatment of previously common and deadly infectious diseases around the world has resulted in a dramatic rise in average life expectancy for many populations over the past century. As a result, NCDs represent a growing focus of public health concerns, particularly in developed countries. One of the challenges in preventing NCDs, participants observed, is that preventive steps need to be taken twenty to thirty years in advance. Personal responsibility is also vital to addressing NCDs, and participants questioned the degree to which governments should be involved in their treatment. As one participant explained, the fight against NCDs and health is really about building social contracts between citizens and states about where their respective responsibilities begin and end. Discussion also touched on the economic costs of an aging population and the growing prevalence of NCDs. With rising health-care costs and nations deciding where to spend their money, NCDs and public health issues can affect the security and economic health of states. Also, rising health-care costs will continue to affect and be affected by growing inequality within and among states. Globally, about 80 percent of health care is paid out of pocket by individuals or families. Therefore, the well-being and survival of individuals will be primarily a function of wealth. Still, some participants were skeptical about the role that global, rather than national, governance could or should play in addressing the challenges in treating noncommunicable diseases.

Additionally, participants briefly spoke about new threats such as the rise of synthetic biology, which allows scientists to create and manipulate life forms. However, no regulatory capacity exists at either the national or global level to ensure that genetic manipulation experiments are taking place safely. Unregulated experiments could accidentally or maliciously create drug resistant genes or organisms that become a global health issue of major concern. This dark scenario underlined one of the panel's recurrent themes: the international framework for cooperation on global public health has failed to keep pace with real-world developments.

Session Five

Climate Change: Do Global Institutions Matter?

In the past year, the UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change released its Fifth Assessment Report, the most comprehensive scientific and socioeconomic review of climate change to date. The report revealed warming in the Earth's atmosphere and oceans, an unprecedented rise in sea levels and concentration of greenhouse gases, and confirmed with confidence that anthropogenic factors were the main cause of climate change since 1950. Yet, as participants noted, the more dire effects of climate change are longer term and more urgent international threats often take priority.

Much of the discussion focused on expectations for the twenty-first United Nations Climate Change Conference, which will be held in Paris in 2015. At the conference governments will seek to adopt a universal climate agreement that will come into effect in 2020. Participants debated whether a legally binding document is achievable by 2015 and what such an agreement would look like. They noted that the problem with these climate negotiations is that countries will remain heavily reliant on fossil fuels until 2050 unless there is investment in alternate technologies. To be competitive, such technologies would need to be paired with carbon pricing, as well as tighter standards for limiting carbon dioxide emissions from existing power plants and vehicles. Some participants counseled against unrealistic expectations for 2015, predicting that the treaty will be weakened when subjected to international consensus. Others, however, argued that a new treaty should be as ambitious as possible in order to address even a small part of the impending crisis.

Participants discussed the question of whether it makes more sense to tackle climate change at the national, regional, or global level. Some participants argued that national-level legislation is the only legally binding way to ensure real change and emphasized the limitations of international agreements when negotiations (and potentially implementation) are subject to national interests and political partisanship. Several participants pointed to the U.S. Republican Party's stance on climate change as a limiting factor to a binding multilateral agreement (as well as a national carbon tax). Other participants contended that unless there is strong global governance on climate change, the majority of governments would not act. To this end, several participants emphasized the importance of U.S. leadership, since it would define the range of the possible. In the same vein,

at the regional level, participants discussed the declining leadership of the European Union in climate change and argued that the European Union needs to reassert its position, second to the United States. Others contended that climate change is a problem that requires nuanced and variegated responses. They emphasized the importance of multilateral forums that could address particular pieces of the climate change puzzle, rather than tackling the entire agenda. Taking a broader view, many participants commented that climate change is a problem requiring a multilayer system, which includes national, civil, private, regional, and international dimensions.

Participants also considered the vital role that new “green” technologies will play in future climate mitigation and adaptation strategies. Although the world will remain heavily dependent on fossil fuels until at least 2040, participants urged that huge investments in technology will be necessary to create new energy sources; store, extract, or reduce greenhouse gas emissions; and adapt to the environmental changes that global warming is expected to induce. To this end, participants examined the shale gas revolution in the United States, made possible by the development of hydraulic fracturing (fracking) and horizontal drilling technologies at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Some argued that shale gas presents a cleaner energy alternative to coal and will therefore reduce greenhouse gas emissions overall. Another noted that shale gas could increase energy security throughout the world, if states no longer need to rely on Russia or the turbulent Middle East for energy. However, others argued that the unknown environmental effects of fracking could be disastrous and that it would only add to the current output of greenhouse gas emissions.

Some participants warned that the efficiency of alternative energy sources could in fact lead to a negative corollary of increased consumption. This concept, which one participant called the “Jevons Paradox,” postulates that as new or renewable energy sources are developed and become both inexpensive and efficient, they will drive down the cost of fossil fuels, including coal, which will then just be consumed by other markets—particularly developing nations. To this end, participants proposed that artificially raising the price of fossil fuels, while instituting carbon taxes and carbon trading, could help restrain consumption. Ultimately, participants argued, even if new or renewable energy sources are developed, renewable energy will at most make up only 20 percent of consumed energy. Thus, technological advancements and alternative energy sources are only a small part of dealing with the overall climate crisis and should not be considered a blanket solution.

The discussion also raised the principle of differentiated responsibilities and the need to increase knowledge of climate change beyond the West as important components of any future negotiations. Publics in many of the countries most vulnerable to climate change have little to no knowledge of the challenge, how to help prevent it, and how to adapt to the impending changes. Increasingly, aid for climate adaptation—as well as the transfer of relevant technologies—will be an important part of development assistance. Participants discussed the potential impediment that intellectual property rights (IPRs) could pose to the spread of new energy sources, emissions mitigation, or crop-adaptation technologies, especially to these vulnerable lower-income countries. If companies do not have a financial incentive to share their innovations, they might choose not to transfer technologies to new markets. To this end, participants proposed that developing trade and investment policies that bolster incentives for technology transfers, as well as possibly subsidies for cooperation, could be essential. The codevelopment of new technologies by multiple countries was also proposed as a potential strategy to circumvent IPR problems.

Session Six

Proliferation of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: The Future of Drones

Since the United States’ first drone mission in 2002, about 480 drone strikes have killed roughly 3,700 people outside of battlefields. The majority of unmanned aerial vehicles have been manufactured by the United States and Israel, but many countries including Russia and China are developing their own UAVs. Though the technological and political hurdles to producing drones are real, their global proliferation is inevitable and international rules governing their deployment will be necessary.

Participants began by examining the reasons militaries are investing in UAV technologies. For one, warfare is about finding the strategic advantage and drones present a clear tactical edge, especially while only a handful of countries have the advanced technology necessary to deploy armed UAVs. Militaries also increasingly value human capital, partly due to the growing reliance on intelligence rather than brute force in warfare and partly due to the public backlash that occurs when the media publicizes casualties. Drone technologies provide a way for militaries to achieve their objectives while minimizing risk for their service men and women. Additionally, drone technologies can target individuals with more precision than traditional military means, reducing the civilian collateral involved in a targeted attack.

Yet, as some participants argued, these technologies decrease the cost of going to war, which could increase the propensity for nations to initiate conflict. Others expressed concern over the potential for governments to abuse drone technologies, warning that the ease of drones use could lead governments to use UAVs for domestic law enforcement, circumventing due process and citizens' privacy rights. Some participants raised the issue that autonomous weapons systems decrease the emotional toll of war, sterilizing battle and causing it to lose its sense of horror, though others contended that drone operators have suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder, regardless of their physical distance from the actual battlefield.

Participants also discussed how drones threaten the international system because they eliminate the human costs associated with more traditional warfare and therefore lower the threshold for military force. For example, the United States would not have conducted as many commando raids—or even bombing runs—as it did drone strikes in Afghanistan or Pakistan, since drones pose less risk to U.S. service members and decreased potential for escalation into full-scale war. Participants noted that as drone proliferation continues, the scale and number of attacks against drones will also increase, and the lack of international norms and laws regarding attacking drones may contribute to the escalation of warfare. Nations experiencing drone attacks are more willing to be aggressive toward the attacking UAVs than against manned aircrafts. One participant pointed to the example of Persian Gulf, where Iran continually tries to take down U.S. surveillance drones to a greater degree than it would be willing to target manned U.S. airplanes.

Participants also debated legal and ethical issues related to drone technologies and the potential rise of autonomous weapons systems. UAV's are already governed by the international laws and norms of warfare in traditional theaters of war, but their use in non-battlefield environments, such as in Yemen, proves more controversial. One participant pointed to the problematic use of drones as an “easy fix” for governments to a violent problem that exists outside of the realm of a war, ignoring due process and norms surrounding law enforcement. For instance, it may be easier to kill the suspected leader of a terrorist cell than to go through the process of capturing and arresting the leader, and putting him or her on trial. Given the fact that armed drone technology has been in significant use for over ten years, some participants argued that it is too late to create new regulations. Other participants were more optimistic, arguing that international laws and norms can and should be created to impose regulations specifically on lethal autonomous weapons systems (armed drones). Others noted that while it is impossible to regulate technology's growth, it may be possible to increase transparency.

On a more positive note, participants discussed how drone technologies have the potential to revolutionize many civilian activities and could be instrumental in humanitarian crises. One example of this is The Sentinel Project, an initiative funded by two nongovernmental organizations, which uses drone technology in its efforts to collect data for early warning and prevention of deterioration into genocide.

Conclusion

Several trends emerged throughout the course of the Council of Councils discussions. One was the issue of what types of institutions—global, regional, national, or local—are best able to address emerging global governance issues, and which ones have the responsibility, the capacity, and the right to respond. This issue of

institutions' roles and responsibilities raised concerns about enforcement of international agreements as well as respect for national sovereignty. A second was the need for stronger leadership in global governance issues, especially from the United States. At the same time, debates over the Internet in light of massive U.S. data surveillance and international concerns over the spillover effects of U.S. macroeconomic policies demonstrated the special burden that falls upon the United States: the need, as a putative global leader, to conduct itself in a manner that is widely perceived as responsible. Finally, it was clear that emerging and developing states are increasingly interested in playing a leading role in global-level issues, and that developed states, in turn, need to adapt existing mechanisms to be more inclusive.