AN INITIATIVE OF THE COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS connecting leading global foreign policy institutes
On July 6–7, Brazil hosted the seventeenth annual BRICS summit in Rio de Janeiro. The program included discussions on global health, development, climate change, the governing of artificial intelligence, trade, and the structure of the institution itself. Four Council of Councils member institutes comment on the summit and the impact of the recent expansion of the bloc.
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The Rio de Janeiro Declaration, released at the seventeenth BRICS Summit in Brazil by the summit’s leaders, reinforces the much-vaunted concept of common ground that has been seriously contested in recent years. The declaration attempts to solidify and clarify the bloc’s common goals as it continues to expand. Brazil’s greatest challenge was ensuring that the percolating rhetoric against the BRICS group (whose membership has grown from Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa to also include Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates) did not sidetrack the summit, especially at a critical juncture of stabilizing partnerships with new bloc members. The continued focus on achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), climate financing, and trade and economic coordination reiterates that the BRICS has only one common cause—development.
In addition, the declaration cautions against a descent into protectionist trade policy, whether through tariff or nontariff action, especially in the name of climate justice. That position is significant and indicates general dissatisfaction with the trajectory that trade and investment policy is taking in the Global North.
A significant point in the declaration, which is in direct contrast to common international narratives about the BRICS, is its support for reforming the Bretton Woods system in order to preserve it. That represents a commitment to the system and a decided vote in favor of salvaging the international order from atrophy, not destroying or replacing it.
Additional important developments from this year’s summit include the “Leader’s Framework Declaration on Climate Finance,” the “BRICS Partnership for the Elimination of Socially Determined Diseases,” document and the “BRICS Leader’s Statement on the Global Governance of Artificial Intelligence.” In ensuring high-level statements on those topics, Brazil has managed the difficult but necessary feat of achieving consensus on specific issues that it had marked as priorities. The bloc’s understanding on all three issues―climate finance, eliminating socially determined diseases, and artificial intelligence (AI) governance―is a significant political statement for future plurilateral and multilateral policymaking. It also provides policy direction and stability to partners of the BRICS countries in an otherwise destabilized world order.
The BRICS has emerged as a major actor in the push for a new multipolar, non-Western-dominated global order, and the group’s latest summit largely confirmed why.
The summit reiterated the bloc’s commitment to reforming the rules-based multilateral system to give the Global South traction in the United Nations, International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and other important multilateral agencies. The summit also confirmed that the BRICS seeks to spur collective action and stronger global governance to address climate change and finance, global health, AI, and the elimination of socially determined diseases like poverty and social exclusion.
At a time when global governance and multilateralism are losing relevance due largely to unilateral interventions and other deglobalizing tendencies, the BRICS is championing stronger, equitable, and inclusive multilateralism, which offers the greatest protection to the interests of poor and weaker states.
That position was well complemented by the summit’s support for diplomacy and joint efforts over unilateral sanctions in resolving international conflicts, including efforts to remedy instability in the Middle East, combat terrorism, and rebuild countries affected by war. Additionally, the push for de-dollarization through the creation of alternative payment systems and possibly a common BRICS currency augurs well for financial, trade, and investment diversification and alternatives. Countries in the Global South have long sought that leverage.
Those objectives align with the multipolarity agenda of the bloc but do not necessarily make the BRICS anti–United States or anti-West, despite the preeminent roles of China and Russia. That perception has provoked increased tariffs on BRICS members by the Trump administration. Moreover, those actions suggest that the economic threat posed by the BRICS is real—especially considering that its members contain nearly 50 percent of the world’s population and critical minerals, and account for over 40 percent of world trade.
President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s pro-West invitation to all G7 and Group of Twenty members to join BRICS to create a fruitful structure of global governance shows that the BRICS itself also has issues of rivalries among its leading members.
Saudi Arabia has not formally joined the BRICS, but it continues to actively engage in the group’s discussions, including through its participation in the 2025 summit in Rio de Janeiro. The summit brought together BRICS members, partner countries, invited guests of the presidency, and key international organizations. During its engagement with the bloc, Saudi Arabia contributed to discussions on global development, rising international tensions, and its role in promoting regional peace and stability. While Riyadh values the flexibility of the current BRICS format, a more institutionalized and structured BRICS could, in fact, prompt greater interest in formal participation from countries that seek clear mechanisms for influence and cooperation
Saudi Arabia also aligns with many of the BRICS’ core economic and development priorities, including infrastructure financing, food security cooperation, and investments in renewable energy, reflecting its broader commitment to sustainable growth and global collaboration. Through its engagement, Saudi Arabia is shaping the dialogue on multipolar cooperation while preserving its own strategic flexibility.
BRICS membership could, in some cases, be perceived as aligning with a specific geopolitical bloc, which could limit a country’s ability to independently shape its foreign relations or be seen as neutral by others. Riyadh’s engagement reflects Saudi Arabia’s strategic preference for flexibility in a multipolar world.
Rather than committing to rigid alliances, the kingdom emphasizes constructive engagement across various platforms, focusing on pragmatic economic cooperation rather than ideological alignment. That approach allows Saudi Arabia to maintain multidirectional partnerships and preserve its foreign policy independence, ensuring it can continue to pursue tailored bilateral relations with each BRICS member state without the constraints that formal bloc membership might imply.
It is worth noting that the BRICS itself remains an informal grouping without permanent institutions or a centralized decision-making framework. Its coordination relies mainly on rotating summits and consensus-building among members. And while that flexible format allows Saudi Arabia to engage in global discussions without the obligations of formal bloc membership, it could also be a limiting factor. A more institutionalized or structured BRICS could, in fact, provide the kind of platform that prompts greater interest and formal participation from countries like Saudi Arabia, which value clear mechanisms for influence and cooperation.
Riyadh views existing multilateral institutions as outdated and unresponsive to the realities of a more multipolar world. Many of these institutions were shaped in a different geopolitical context and have struggled to adapt, often failing to provide equitable representation or effectively address current global challenges. Close working ties with the expanded BRICS thus allows Saudi Arabia to contribute to shaping a more inclusive and multipolar world order, with the BRICS+ as one platform for constructive international engagement—but not the only one.
The BRICS, whose membership has grown to ten with the addition of Indonesia, represents a diverse political and economic group. It is bound together by two elements: a desire to have a greater say in the institutions of global governance, and an imperative to reduce its member countries’ dependence on the current financial system that makes them vulnerable due to the role of the U.S. dollar as a reserve currency.
Some of the most concrete proposals from this year’s BRICS summit included reforming the global financial architecture. Two points call for specific mention. The first is a set of concrete recommendations on international financial institutions reform, which were set out in a document, “BRICS Rio De Janeiro Vision for IMF Quota and Governance Reform” [PDF]. Among other items, the document calls for an increase in basic vote shares to represent low-income countries in a more balanced way, and for quota realignment to reflect members’ relative positions in the global economy while protecting the quota shares of the poorest members.
The second was the proposed establishment of a BRICS Multilateral Guarantee Initiative, which would provide tailored instruments to de-risk strategic investment and improve creditworthiness in developing economies. That initiative would be piloted by the New Development Bank, a multilateral development bank established by the BRICS in 2015. In a more constrained global financing environment, one where geopolitical considerations will become more prevalent in investment decisions, such an initiative could help close the gap between the perceived risk and investment opportunities in developing countries.
However, the addition of new members has also changed the dynamics within the group, which was clearly evident in the foreign ministers meeting that preceded the summit, in April 2025.
In contrast to previous years, this year’s foreign ministers meeting failed to issue a joint statement because of disagreements regarding the reform of the UN Security Council. Historically, that statement had recognised the aspirations of Brazil, India, and South Africa to play a greater role in the Security Council, even though it had fallen short of endorsing their claims to a permanent seat. The Rio de Janeiro Declaration refers to the African Union’s Ezulwini Consensus, which called for two permanent seats with veto power for Africa on the Security Council, but mentions only Brazil and India’s aspirations to a greater role in the Security Council. Furthermore, some new members and partner countries have strong anti-Western positions, a stance which not all member states share.
As the BRICS brings more countries under its umbrella, it will need to develop new working methods to ensure it retains focus and effectiveness. It has positioned itself as a grouping that advances the interests of the Global South at a time when the region has become economically stronger. Areas of convergence for the BRICS include global governance reform, coupled with initiatives to reduce dependence or exposure to the U.S. dominated financial system, and diversification of economic relations.
That will not be easy. A United States that approaches international relations through a bilateral lens can compel countries to protect their national interests rather than working together. But it may also spur more to join a bloc increasingly perceived as having the heft to take on the superpower. Greater common purpose may be the outcome of an increasingly antagonistic global landscape.
