Twenty-five years after the end of the Cold War, the threat of nuclear weapons use is again moving up the political agenda. Russian nuclear posturing over the Ukraine crisis, an accelerating nuclear arms race in Asia, and substantial investments by nuclear weapon possessor states in the upkeep and modernization of their nuclear postures are indicators of a comeback of the nuclear factor in international politics.

For a growing number of nonnuclear weapon states, these developments indicate a failure of established arms control and disarmament efforts. They are increasingly skeptical whether nuclear weapon states (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) that are recognized under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) are committed to fulfilling their disarmament commitments.

This divide puts stress on the global nuclear order, which rests on the NPT. The NPT review conference (April 27–May 22) in New York provides a good opportunity for the treaty’s 190 member states to preserve and strengthen the nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament regime.

Given the growing polarization among NPT member states, success of the quinquennial review conference will likely hinge on the ability of middle powers to hold the regime together. Influential moderate states, such as Brazil, Germany, Japan, and South Africa will need to reduce centrifugal forces by persuading the nuclear weapon states to issue credible and shared disarmament pledges, while at the same time constraining those who argue that disarmament is best pursued outside of the NPT framework. Such a new, credible commitment to reduce the role of nuclear weapons is likely to be a precondition for agreement on more effective nonproliferation measures.

Many issues drive NPT members apart. Russian violations of the security guarantees given to Ukraine in the 1994 Budapest Memorandum weaken the credibility of security guarantees. North Korea, which is the only state to have announced its withdrawal from the NPT, continues to defy calls for a return to the nonproliferation regime. The nuclear suppliers group provoked questions about double standards applied by the nuclear technology holders when it exempted India from its rules in 2008.

Yet, overcoming differences on nuclear disarmament and maintaining a zone free of nuclear weapons in the Middle East are likely to be two key preconditions for success in New York. And there is also one glimmer of hope for progress at the review conference.

Differences on Nuclear Arms Control

At the 2010 review conference, NPT member states had agreed on an Action Plan that detailed sixty-four specific steps to strengthen the nonproliferation regime. The nuclear weapon states’ promise to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in security policies and doctrines was and remains a key foundation of the disarmament agenda. That pledge reflected the prevalent optimistic mood in 2010. President Barack Obama, in his historic Prague speech, had just announced that the United States would take the lead in pursuing the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. Also, Moscow and Washington had agreed to reduce the number of operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons under the New START treaty.

Five years later, the winds have shifted. Some NPT nuclear weapon states have increased the role of nuclear weapons in defense and deterrence postures. The U.S.-Russian nuclear arms control process remains stalled, with both sides exchanging accusations of breaching arms control commitments.

Against this background, many nonnuclear weapon states are increasingly skeptical that the step-by-step approach toward nuclear disarmament embodied in the NPT is still the best way to make progress toward a world free of nuclear weapons. They point to the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any nuclear weapon use and push for negotiations on a nuclear weapons ban. These governments, supported by nongovernmental organizations, argue that nuclear weapons need to be outlawed comprehensively, just as the possession of biological and chemical weapons or, more recently, antipersonnel landmines and cluster munitions have been prohibited through multilateral instruments. Some even maintain that the NPT will never be able to provide a credible framework for nuclear disarmament.

Yet most nuclear weapon states refuse to even engage in a debate about a nuclear weapons ban. This gap makes it difficult for moderate nonnuclear weapon states, such as Australia, Germany, the Netherlands, and Japan, to argue that incremental process toward nuclear disarmament remains the best way to preserve the nuclear order.

Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East

Political rifts have also deepened in the Middle East. Regional violence has complicated the debate about the role of nuclear weapons in the region. Israel is more insecure, while many Arab states have for a long time accused Western states of turning a blind eye toward Israel’s nuclear capabilities. (Like India and Pakistan, Israel has never signed the NPT.) At the 2010 NPT review conference, Arab states successfully pushed for an agreement to hold a conference on a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. Yet, efforts to convene such a meeting have so far failed.

Two scenarios are worrying. Arab states could walk out of the review conference in protest, as Egypt did at an NPT meeting in 2013. The second scenario may be worse for the nonproliferation regime’s legitimacy: Some NPT members could question the validity of a 1995 decision to prolong the treaty’s duration, arguing that this decision was based on a promise to make progress toward a Middle East free of nuclear weapons.

Lausanne as a Starting Point on Nonproliferation

Progress made toward a resolution of the twelve-year old dispute over Iran’s nuclear program provides a glimmer of hope for the review conference. The April 2, 2015, agreement reached by the P5+1 (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, plus Germany) and Iran at Lausanne demonstrates that it is possible, in principle, to bring a violator back into compliance with nonproliferation rules, through diplomacy and without regime change. Saudi Arabia, Iran’s main regional competitor, has reacted cautiously but positively to the Lausanne agreement, raising hopes that a comprehensive accord with Iran could reduce the risk of a regional nuclear race.

It is unlikely that the P5+1and Iran will agree on a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action before the review conference concludes, given the June 30 deadline of the P5+1-Iran talks. Yet, the fact that Iran has endorsed strengthened verification measures and accepted long-term limitations of its nuclear program are positive developments from an NPT perspective. This mood may carry over into the nonproliferation debate in New York, particularly because Iran will be chairing the group of nonaligned states, which has traditionally been skeptical of strengthened checks on nonnuclear weapon states.

Broaden the Middle Ground

The NPT review conference will show the strength of the commitment of vital actors to the nuclear order. Yet agreement on a Final Document—generally viewed as essential to  success—is likely to depend on the ability of middle powers to hold the regime together. Moderation, not polarization, should be a maxim of all those in New York interested in preserving the NPT. Several steps may be useful in this regard:

• The sixty-four-point action plan agreed on at the 2010 review conference needs to be the starting point for discussions on a final document. Reopening the debate about the validity of past pledges is likely to be a recipe for dispute and possibly disaster.

• Moderate states need to pursue their goals in flexible, interest-based coalitions. The same polarization that is affecting NPT coherence generally has paralyzed existing groupings, such as the European Union and the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI), a cross-regional grouping of twelve states that have jointly promoted a step-by-step approach to nuclear disarmament. For the first time, the EU will not be coming to New York with an agreed common position. The NPDI may be able to do little more than rehash established positions. New alliances of middle powers could be based on a shared understanding of the need for progress on nuclear disarmament but also stake out the reasons why more radical disarmament proposals may be counterproductive.

• On nonproliferation, some of the aspects of the Lausanne agreement could be starting points for a discussion on strengthened and universal nonproliferation rules and procedures. Thus, member states should endorse the progress made in the P5+1 talks with Iran and encourage the International Atomic Energy Agency to strengthen its role in verifying compliance of the commitments of nonnuclear weapon states under the NPT.

• Member states should decide to continue efforts toward agreement on a Middle East free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. While waiting for better conditions to address regional nuclear disarmament, progress can be made outside of the NPT on universalization of other treaties regulating weapons of mass destruction, such as the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the Biological Weapons Convention, and the Chemical Weapons Convention.

In the end, failure to agree on a final document at the review conference by itself does not spell disaster. Only four of the eight review conferences that have taken place since 1970 did conclude with a consensus outcome. The more important yardstick for success is the degree to which important NPT state parties—the nuclear weapons states above all but also middle powers—will credibly underpin their commitment to the NPT as the framework for pursuing disarmament and nonproliferation. Indicators for assessing this commitment include the level of representation and the seriousness of preparation, but most importantly the degree to which these states are willing to change their own policies to match the treaty’s purposes. Treaties usually don’t die with a bang, but with a whimper—when they become viewed as increasingly irrelevant.