Two simultaneous conflicts in Europe and the Middle East have brought the international order into flux. Russia’s annexation of Crimea and destabilization of eastern Ukraine have deeply undermined European security. Meanwhile, the self-declared Islamic State’s proclamation of a caliphate in western Iraq and eastern Syria has unsettled the Middle East. While it may be tempting for foreign policymakers to consider "Syraq" and "Rukraine" as unrelated crises, the tensions in Eastern Europe have strong implications for the situation in the Middle East, and vice versa. Indeed one of the greatest challenges to global governance is the combination of an assertive and declining Russia, and a disintegrating Middle East.
The Ukraine conflict has highlighted just how differently Russia and the West conceive of international relations and hints at the reemergence of Great Power rivalry. But focusing only on the divergence on Ukraine between Russia and the West is misleading; the profound divergence is rooted in the complex interactions among not only Washington, London, Paris, and Moscow, but also in the Arab world, among Turkey, Iran, and Israel. Furthermore, the Ukraine conflict highlights how states beyond Russia, namely China, India, and some Middle Eastern countries, have foreign policy priorities that diverge with those of the West (take for instance the fact that Beijing, Delhi, and Tel Aviv did not sanction Russia after its annexation of Crimea).
Russia’s perspective on sovereignty
Over the last two decades, Russia has rigorously observed the principles of multilateralism within the United Nations framework, but it has also ensured that any multilateral actions do not impinge on its sovereignty. Moscow supports the role of the UN as the principal body regulating international relations provided that its collective decision-making is done on the basis of equality. The UN Security Council (UNSC) provided Moscow with a significant check on U.S. power after the collapse of the USSR.
Russia believes that Western military interventions undertaken without mandate from the UNSC have dramatically destabilized the international system. But, in a sense, Russia has mimicked this behavior. It can be argued that during the last decade four permanent members of the UNSC have used force to fragment three sovereign countries: the United States and the UK in Iraq, France and the UK in Libya, and Russia in Ukraine. To some extent, Russia's policy in Ukraine has mimicked Western policies in the Middle East and North Africa, by intervening militarily on the European soil.
But with the annexation of Crimea, the Kremlin forfeited one of its central arguments against the West on the principle of nonintervention. There is now a visible disconnect between Russia's actions on the ground and its stated commitment to international law and the territorial integrity of sovereign states. Russian diplomacy is contradictory in referring to Kosovo’s independence to justify the annexation of Crimea, given that Russia has not recognized Kosovo, while Crimea has been integrated into the Russian Federation. Unsurprisingly, Russia has favored its direct security interest over international norms, and in doing so relinquished its perceived moral high ground.
Russia’s relations in the Middle East
Russia seems intent on redesigning the international order and has adopted widely varying stances toward Middle East countries that could have significant implications for the West. Russia’s relationship with Iran is pivotal. Both countries are under sanctions, and their interests may converge further. Russia intends to strengthen its position as an arms supplier to one of the leading regional powers in the Middle East. To run its strategic competition with Sunni Saudi Arabia, which relies on Western arms imports, Shia Iran strongly needs to be militarily supported. Nuclear energy and arms will be prioritized by Moscow in its relations with Iran. Putin’s decision to lift the ban on the transfer of the S-300 air defense system to Iran reflects a new step for Russia in the Middle East. Russia is rewarding Iran for its efforts to realize a deal with the international community over its nuclear program. Meanwhile, Moscow has delivered a crystal-clear message to Westerners: Even if the talks fail by the end of June, Russia will not support new sanctions against Iran.
At the same time, Russia shows no political tolerance toward Gulf regimes. Russia has very complicated relations with Saudi Arabia, a strong U.S. ally since 1945 and the fourth-highest military spender in the world. Furthermore, because Russia is the only big power not involved in Gulf Arab countries with the purchase of energy, Moscow feels it can easily criticize their relationships with France, the United States, and the UK. According to Moscow, there is a huge contradiction between claiming to fight against terrorism and maintaining close relations with such countries. Moreover, Moscow claims that the major threat is coming from the Sunni push in the region and beyond, as in the Caucasus and Central Asia.
Beyond Iran, Russia maintains some choice diplomatic relations in the Middle East. In Syria, Russia has been the main military sponsor of Bashar al-Assad's regime. The use of chemical weapons was a turning point for Western public opinion, and in September 2013, Moscow proposed a potential hand over of the Assad regime’s chemical arsenal to stop a potential Western military intervention. Traditionally, Russia and Egypt have had quite intensive relations, which have been recently reactivated with President Abdul Fattah al Sissi. Meanwhile, Russia has improved its relations with Turkey, in particular in the energy field after the cancellation of the South Stream project in December 2014. However, this relationship remains uncertain due to the situation in Crimea and Ankara's ambiguous diplomacy in the Middle East. Moscow is also active in Iraqi Kurdistan. Belonging to NATO, Turkey is also seen as a possible threat on the southern flank of Russia's territory.
Finally, the relationship between Russia and Israel is substantive, in particular in the security field. This bilateral relationship is often underestimated in Europe and the United States: Take, for instance, the absence of Israel in the adoption of the UN General Assembly Resolution against the annexation of Crimea in March 2014. At the same time, Russia has always supported Palestine. Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas has strong connections to Russia, and in March 2006, Russia-Hamas talks confirmed the Kremlin’s position that it does not consider Hamas a terrorist organization. Where the West is often torn between the two parties, Russia is able to balance relations with both.
Over the last two decades, Russia has been consistently targeted by terrorist attacks. The relations between the Caucasus Emirate, a militant jihadist group whose aim is to drive out the Russian presence in the North Caucasus and establish an Islamic emirate in that region, and the global jihad remain highly complex. However, a growing influx of volunteers from the Caucasus in “Syraq” has been noted (an estimated 1,500 Chechens might be currently fighting in Syria). Most extremists from the Caucasus seem to turn to the Islamic State rather than to the Caucasus Emirate.
Policy focus
Russia’s relations in the Middle East could be a game changer in its rivalry with the West. Given strong interactions between the two theaters in “Syraq” and in “Rukraine,” European policymakers should focus on the following:
- Chechnya and the North Caucasus: Increasing instability in Chechnya and the North Caucasus presents one major connection between the “Syraq” and “Rukraine” theaters. On the one hand, Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov dispatched several hundred fighters to fight alongside pro-Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine. Kadyrov also organized a massive public demonstration in Grozny against “the enemies of Islam,” denouncing Western journalists and politicians’ response to the terrorist attacks in Paris against the satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo. On the other hand, many trained fighters from the North Caucasus joined the Islamic State, and there is a threat that these radicalized jihadists may return and create instability. More deeply, the stability of Russia depends not only on the relationship between Ramsan Kadyrov and Vladimir Putin, but also on the future role of the Caucasus Emirate within the global jihad.
- Iran Nuclear Deal: The agreement between the P5+1 and Iran over its nuclear program should be concluded by the end of June 2015, though it may be postponed once again. Needless to say, it is one the greatest challenges to both regional and global stability. Putin’s decision to transfer the S-300 air defense system to Iran may foreshadow future Russian policy. If talks ultimately fail, and the sanctions against Iran remain, a rapprochement between Iran and Russia--both sanctioned countries--is likely. If talks succeed, and the sanctions are quickly removed, then Iran could be taken as an example of an outlier state being reintegrated into the international community. It would be a clear and potent message to Moscow. In the coming years, Western sanctions against Russia on Ukraine will dramatically impact its positioning in the Middle East—to say nothing about its relations with China.
