Why the 2024 U.S. Presidential Election is Critically Important for Latin America and the World

The U.S. presidential election is important for Latin America due to the long-standing economic and political relations between the United States and the region. As one of the largest trading partners for many Latin American countries, any changes in the United States’ foreign, trade, or economic policies would have a substantial impact. Furthermore, this election will have consequences for the world, considering the leading role the United States plays in multilateral institutions addressing global challenges.

The U.S. presidential election is critically important to Latin America and the world for the following reasons:

First, multilateral institutions are facing a moment of protectionism, democratic erosion, and geoeconomic fragmentation. The next U.S. president will have a leadership role in these institutions and influence how they tackle global challenges such as geopolitical conflicts, the AI revolution, and climate change. It is also worth noting that in 2026 the United States will hold the presidency of the Group of Twenty leading economies (G20).

Second, there are acute differences between the U.S. presidential candidates on foreign policy, particularly regarding support for international institutions, free trade agreements, immigration, and security policies. Donald Trump’s first term was marked by a more transactional approach to trade, reflecting his "America First" views. His administration renegotiated the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) into the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) and withdrew from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP).

Overall, Trump’s presidency showed weak support for multilateralism and multilateral institutions. This was also evidenced by the U.S. withdrawal from major agreements such as the Paris Climate Accord and from institutions such as UNESCO and the UN Human Rights Council, and by blocking appointments in the WTO Appellate Body. In sum, Trump questioned the liberal international order the United States helped build in the twentieth century.

A weakened multilateral system could harm the integration of Latin America into the world economy, as it could weaken economic stability, development and climate finance, trade dispute arbitration, green energy transitions, and sustainable infrastructure investments.

If Kamala Harris is elected, her presidency would likely build on many of the policies and principles championed by President Joe Biden, with particular focus on multilateralism, economic cooperation, immigration reform, and climate change. Harris would likely continue Biden’s approach of fostering stronger economic partnerships with Latin America, emphasizing inclusive and sustainable development, like the “America’s Partnership for Economic Prosperity”.

As Richard Haass has stated, these differences hide an important continuity in U.S. foreign policy―the strategic rivalry with China. Also, in the Latin American markets, China increasingly competes with the United States.

In conclusion, the results of the U.S. presidential election will influence Latin American economies, migration trends, regional security, and the geopolitical balance regionally and internationally, as well as the stability and strength of the international order.

Implications of the 2024 U.S. Presidential Election for Canada

In an era marked by rapid geopolitical transformation, it’s difficult to overstate the pivotal nature of the 2024 U.S. presidential election. The wild card, as has been the case since 2016, is Donald Trump.

It can be tempting to interpret Trump’s political rise and continuing centrality in global affairs as a Black Swan event; an aberration driven by the unique particularities of his story and personality. In my view, this is a misread―one fraught with risk for Canada.

Ample evidence suggests that Trump has ridden a rising wave of isolationism, inflected with xenophobia, that had its inception in the years immediately following the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States. The ensuing wars―in which the world’s greatest superpower strained its treasury and military in an ultimately fruitless attempt to export democracy to Afghanistan and Iraq― have had a compounding effect. Ultimately, they sowed the seeds of an incremental withdrawal of the United States from global leadership, which is still under way.

Trump, far from a one-off, is thus best understood as the possible next and most extreme in a growing line of isolationist U.S. presidents. A Democratic victory in November would forestall this trend, somewhat. A Republican victory would greatly accelerate it, while also subjecting Canadians to a renewed bout of the cross-border disruption that was pervasive during Trump’s first term as president. Trump has promised to impose a ten-percent, across-the-board tariff on all imports. This would put Canada back where it was in early 2017, when the early Trump White House was vowing to scrap the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and summarly withdrew from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). Only a multi-year, full-court press from Canada, spanning the political spectrum and all orders of government, averted that outcome.

What does this mean, in practical terms? There could be three key impacts should Trump win in November.

First, it would mark a strategic victory for the emerging authoritarian axis of China, Russia, Iran and North Korea. Because of a likely drawdown in U.S. military aid, Ukraine would face renewed pressure to negotiate the loss of its territory, including the Donbas and Crimea, to Vladimir Putin’s Russia. Though Trump has historically taken a rhetorical posture that presents him as being tough on China, he has also repeatedly threatened to withdraw the U.S. military from outposts such as Japan and South Korea, unless allies pay for the privilege. Consequently, under Trump 2.0, Taiwan would immediately become more vulnerable to Chinese pressure, bullying, and threats of invasion.

Second, the government of Canada would face renewed pressure, both from the United States and domestically, to quickly ramp up spending on national security. This would include both conventional military spending on planes, ships, and personnel, and also drones, cyber defence, and intelligence capacity. U.S. pressure, as was the case in Trump’s first term, would be framed as a request for Canada to do its share in the protection of North America―a fair ask from a major ally. Canadian domestic pressure would stem from the gathering realization that the United States, under MAGA control, is no longer a reliable partner and protector for its northern neighbour, and might indeed pose a threat.

Third, Canadian business could expect another blunt assault on their exports in the form of U.S. import tariffs. The United States-Mexico-Canada trade agreement (USMCA) comes up for renewal July 1, 2026. Canada’s manufacturing economy and system of supply-managed dairy would be sure to be targets of second Trump administration, as they were for the first.

Trust, Predictability and Shared Vision: The Challenges Between Mexico and the United States 

Kamala Harris or Donald Trump will assume responsibility for relations with a Mexico that is less democratic, less secure, and less prosperous. Claudia Sheinbaum, Mexico’s new president, confronts the enormous challenge of reversing the country’s negative trends without sufficient financial resources. Her ability to act independently from her predecessor, Andrés Manuel López Obrador, will significantly influence the U.S.-Mexico relationship. The past Mexican administration had a variety of relevant policy disagreements with the United States (e.g., on border management, addressing root causes of migration, energy security) that have clouded the bilateral relation. Sheinbaum faces a difficult balancing act of expanding Mexican interests while addressing issues of serious concern to the United States and avoiding U.S. hand-forcing tactics, like those exerted by the Trump administration in the past.  

U.S. Foreign Policy 
The next U.S. president will need to correct the failed policies of the Joe Biden administration toward Mexico. Some of these failed policies originate in a differing understanding of concepts such as democracy, as checks and balances of political powers, social participation, and transparency in the decision-making process are not part of current Mexican leaders' conceptions of democracy. Thus, an ambassador who is capable of grasping and effectively communicating differences should be appointed with the aim of reestablishing a true dialogue, rebuilding trust, and advancing U.S. positions. In similar terms, any new U.S. administration should work with Mexican civil society to strengthen democratic values. 

Migration 
Trump has proposed a restrictive immigration policy involving mass deportations, family separations, and ending the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals, or DACA, which would have a significant impact on the Mexican population in the United States, because the largest portion of DACA beneficiaries are from Mexican origin. Although Harris would maintain DACA, she would also introduce stricter migration laws. Extreme approaches from either side could provoke negative reactions from the Mexican government and further erode the perception of the United States within  Mexican society. Yet, both nations need to cooperate to address root causes of migration by improving conditions in migrant countries of origin, like Central American countries, including Mexico. Additionally, Mexico should seek to enhance protections for its migrants in the United States. 

Democracy and Rule of Law 
The United States will need to define and clearly convey minimum acceptable standards for a democratic system and legal certainty under the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA). Recent reforms in Mexico suggest a trend toward authoritarianism, with the executive branch gaining power at the expense of the judiciary. Harris would likely advocate for human rights in Mexico, while Trump is not expected to emphasize this issue.  

Security and Crime 
Any American president will increase pressure on Mexico to collaborate more around security issues. Mexico suffers from limited intelligence-sharing and training, and needs to strengthen all of its security institutions. Sheinbaum most likely will insist on the need for the United States to acknowledge and assume responsibilities for drug violence, drug consumption and its reduction, as well as for the introduction of weapons to Mexico. 

Prosperity and Trade 
Mexico, the United States’ top trading partner, faces challenges due to weakened education, struggling health systems, and declining productivity. President Sheinbaum must choose between integrating Mexico into the global economy or pursuing a state-controlled, ideologically driven path. Harris would push for USMCA compliance, while Trump would likely introduce new tariffs. In any case, as the USMCA is up for review in 2026, the multifaceted tensions between Mexico and the United States―including the apparent growing presence of Chinese manufacturing in Mexico―will boil over during the process. 

Sustainability 
Sheinbaum plans to rebuild the state-owned energy companies’ supremacy in Mexico at the expense of reducing the much-needed private investment to modernize the sector. The large investments needed raise concerns about Mexico’s sovereign debt and long-term financial health, as well as the ability to provide the necessary output to fulfill energy demands for the nearshoring boom. To this, international pressure to meet the commitments of the Paris Agreement must be added. While a Harris administration would likely be part of such pressure, a Trump administration would only address private sector participation in the Mexican energy sector insofar as it has a direct impact on U.S. interests.  

Conclusion 
Any U.S. administration should strengthen the architecture of the bilateral relationship to implement effective agreements and avoid hand-forcing tactics. Although the challenges are significant, the benefits of our shared interests and opportunities as first trading partners, neighbors, and longstanding friends are of utmost relevance.   

Hardball on Trade and Migration vs. Status Quo 
 

The U.S. presidential election will have far-reaching political and economic consequences for Latin America. A second Donald Trump administration would likely play hardball with Latin American governments, threatening tariffs and foreign aid cuts to compel them to cooperate on Trump’s priorities. These priorities include the mass deportation of millions of undocumented Americans, tighter border controls across the hemisphere, and a halt to Chinese firms importing goods to U.S. markets via Mexico (Trump has promised an early renegotiation of the United States-Canada-Mexico Agreement, the USMCA, for this purpose).  

Trump could strengthen incentives for reshoring, infrastructure, and energy investment, favoring fossil fuels in the process. He would likely ease pressure on Latin American governments engaged in corruption and autocratic behavior, provided they align themselves with Washington on key geopolitical issues, which would likely accelerate regional democratic backsliding.  

If elected, Trump would nurture close ties with the right-wing presidents of El Salvador and Argentina, while relations with Brazil, Colombia, and other countries governed by the left could become bumpier. The former president could also tighten sanctions on the region’s leftist autocracies and hybrid regimes, which would probably use Trump’s actions as pretext to crack down domestically.   

If she were elected, Vice President Kamala Harris would likely continue Biden’s approach to the hemisphere, with minor modifications, such as a greater focus on the Caribbean. She, too, would seek to encourage nearshoring in Latin America. Additionally, Harris would likely try to address concerns over potentially noncompliant Mexican agricultural and energy policies in the scheduled 2026 USMCA review, but without applying Trump’s hardball tactics.  

Harris is likely to continue the multilateral approach to migration management launched by the Biden administration, focusing on addressing the root causes, increasing border security, and expanding legal migration pathways, without jettisoning Biden’s tightened policy on asylum seekers. On democracy, Harris could attempt to prevent further backsliding in the region through diplomatic engagement and targeted pressure. However, unless she makes it a top foreign policy priority (which is unlikely), she will have difficulty arresting the ongoing erosion of several of the region’s democracies.  

Compared to Trump, she is more likely to try to partner with regional governments like Brazil on addressing climate change and encouraging green transitions. Neither Trump nor Harris as president will have the tools to remove Venezuela’s deeply entrenched dictator, Nicolás Maduro. Still, either president would have to weigh difficult trade-offs regarding sanctions—which could shrink regime insiders’ rents, but also risk increasing refugee and migrant flows and encouraging deeper economic ties between Caracas and U.S. geopolitical adversaries—and either will face the challenge of responding to millions of Venezuelans continuing to leave their homeland. Both would try to address fentanyl trafficking (Trump has promised military strikes within Mexico), but without full cooperation from China or Mexico, both will struggle to make gains. Latin America’s greatest challenges will remain transnational organized crime and slow-growing economies. A contested election or disruptive transition in the United States also threatens to diminish U.S. credibility and standing in Latin America as China works to increase its influence in countries like Peru and Brazil.