Why Europe Is Looking to Harris

In many parts of Europe, the 2024 U.S. presidential and congressional elections are seen as a potential inflection point in transatlantic relations. This is primarily due to European concerns about Donald Trump’s chances of returning to the presidency.

First, European leaders are concerned about a continued and possibly irreversible decline in democratic norms if Trump returns to the presidency. Europeans are worried not only about U.S. domestic politics—the danger of authoritarianism spreading in the United States—but also about the impact on the international order, which they believe could suffer an even more serious setback from a second Trump term. Many worry that a Trump return could embolden other populist-nationalist leaders in Europe and beyond, as was seen during his time in office his.

Second, Europeans are deeply concerned about the implications of another Trump presidency for their security. U.S. support is clearly still crucial for NATO and Ukraine. Without a clear commitment from the United States, NATO would lack the political leadership and the conventional and nuclear capabilities to defend Europe. Based on Trump’s own statements, Europeans expect him to use NATO’s Article 5 as leverage to ramp up military budgets even more than they have done in reaction to Russia’s war on Ukraine. They also fear that he could use threats to withdraw from NATO to settle non-defense issues with the European Union—such as trade deficits—on his terms. Another cause for concern is Trump’s stated interest in negotiating a deal with Russian President Vladimir Putin on Ukraine. There is little confidence among European leaders in Trump’s willingness—or ability—to make negotiations with Putin on a cease-fire part of a comprehensive strategy with lasting benefits, let alone a peace plan that would fully protect Ukraine’s sovereignty.

Third, Europeans fear that another Trump presidency would be disastrous for transatlantic economic relations. Based on his statements and past actions, he is prepared to return to tariffs and other coercive economic measures against U.S. allies, including the European Union. Renewed tariffs on everything from steel and aluminum exports to autos could deal a blow to the economies of many member states. In addition, Trump could be expected to increase pressure on the European Union to follow his China policy and urge it to fully decouple EU economies from the Chinese.  

Europeans are less anxious about a Kamala Harris presidency. Harris has stated her unwavering support for NATO and for Ukraine. She has also expressed support for international institutions and the need to cooperate on global challenges such as climate change. This is not to say that there would be no challenges for the European Union; Harris would also have high expectations of European nations. This would likely include greater support for Ukraine and increased defense spending within NATO. Harris also favors a robust economic policy toward China. She can be expected to seek European cooperation on a common approach to reining in Beijing’s increasingly aggressive economic and foreign policies.

A Vulnerable Europe Awaits Next U.S. Commander in Chief

Russia’s full-blown war against Ukraine has finally pushed Europe to increase its defense autonomy. But years of underinvestment mean that the United States remains an essential pillar in European security. The election of a new U.S. commander-in-chief is therefore of crucial importance for the future direction of Europe’s security landscape.

The U.S. president’s approach to NATO—the cornerstone of Europe’s collective defense—has profound effects on the alliance’s cohesion and effectiveness. A President Kamala Harris, who strongly supports NATO and is committed to upholding its principles, would reinforce the security guarantees that have underpinned European stability since World War II. Conversely, a second Trump presidency that questions the value of NATO or pushes for a reduction in U.S. involvement will create uncertainty within the alliance, emboldening adversaries and weakening Europe’s security architecture.

The U.S. president’s stance on Russia and its enablers, including policies related to sanctions, military presence in Eastern Europe, and support for Ukraine, directly affects European security. A strong U.S. response to Russian aggression as advocated by Harris and her vice president pick Tim Walz would deter further destabilization in Europe, while the laissez faire approach favored by team Trump-Vance would most certainly encourage Russian actions that threaten European nations.

U.S. leadership is also critical in addressing other global threats that directly impact Europe, such as wars in the Middle East, cyberattacks, and freedom of navigation in international waters. A Harris administration that prioritizes international cooperation in confronting authoritarianism and is willing to engage in joint efforts with European allies would enhance the transatlantic ability to counter these threats. A more erratic, unilateralist, and isolationist approach that would be expected in a second Trump administration would leave Europe more vulnerable, as it relies heavily on U.S. intelligence, military capabilities, and diplomatic influence to manage these challenges.

Europe has been slow to Trump-proof itself and will struggle to respond collectively to new security challenges, thus leaving the continent more vulnerable to malevolent actors. Harris’s internationalist tone on the campaign trail suggests that she will double down on Biden’s foreign policy objectives and thus give Europe more time to bolster its defense preparedness in cooperation with the United States. But Europeans would be best advised not to de-prioritize the build-up of their own deterrence and defense capacities. A Europe-friendly President Harris would enter office as fatigue with the three-year old war in Ukraine runs high and the likelihood of shaky ceasefire deals increases. Moreover, Harris’s relative lack of foreign policy experience would likely be tested by China and Russia in other theaters, thus leaving Europe to compete for attention.

A Deep Change is Underway, No Matter Who Wins

It’s “the most important election in our lives,” said Vice President Kamala Harris at the Democratic National Convention earlier this month. That certainly holds true for us Europeans, too. Never before has a U.S. election mattered so much for Europe. At stake is a consensus about the importance of global and regional institutions such as the United Nations, NATO, European Union, transatlantic alliance, human-rights system, and economic system. Also at risk is the sense of shared thinking about international relations as they are taught at universities, and perhaps even the main messages in our Western cultural production, from songs to TV shows—all this is at stake.

Based on Donald Trump’s campaign rhetoric, the greatest danger of another Trump presidency is letting Russian President Vladimir Putin do whatever he wants to U.S. allies and arranging a deal with him while excluding Ukrainian input with “one phone call”. Should this happen, not only does Ukraine lose the war and its sovereignty, but the rest of Europe is left on its own faced with the threat of Russia and dwindling world order. Dubious European military capabilities—and a lack of will to improve and use them—combined with a neo-isolationist detached United States will not be able to deter Russia from further aggressions, as war is the only way for the Russian criminal regime to survive. All despots and autocratically inclined leaders, even in allied democracies, will be similarly empowered.

Vice President Kamala Harris made it clear in her nomination acceptance speech that on that point—standing up to Russia and defending Ukraine—she will be steadfast. But Harris as president epitomizes a generational change in American politics that means shifts and challenges for Europe, too.

First, with U.S. President Joe Biden we bid farewell to post–Cold War politicians, viscerally connected with European countries for better or worse, who have regarded the transatlantic partnership with a semi-religious dogma. With Harris, Europe will have to embrace a new United States, more West coast, deeply connected to Asia and Latin America, perhaps at the expense of the partnership with Europe.

Second, Europe needs U.S. leadership on an array of global issues, but that leadership is far from obvious. If Harris doesn’t change U.S. policies in the Middle East, Europe won’t either, which will further weigh down the standing of the collective West. Likewise, Europe would benefit from a fresher, pragmatic-yet-principled U.S. approach to China, as exemplified in the experience of Harris’s vice presidential candidate, Tim Walz—but powerful forces push it toward conflict. Despite representing the United States at COP28, Harris is ominously silent on climate change, which—if it continues—will stifle European efforts to tackle the problem, too. On cybersecurity, hybrid threats, the rise of artificial intelligence, and the quest for space domination, Europe is like a child in a forest without a strong partner in the United States. If Harris is victorious and can translate the euphoria into invigorated U.S. leadership, it will be good news for Europe. But if she is elected and moves the United States inward, Europeans will have to regroup. Trumpism is too dangerous to be a wakeup call for Europe, but Harris, as a friendly leader, could be.

The Future of European Security Is at Stake

Europe has been on the receiving end of U.S. power and foreign policy decisions for more than seven decades. But U.S. elections have only recently become a source of deep concern. Since 2018, Europe has even become intently focused on U.S. midterm elections.

During the Cold War, a bipartisan consensus underpinned the country’s commitment to Europe’s security, and elections were not the preoccupation for Europe that they are today.

In the 1990s, the United States had foreign policy choices to make, and the right choices were not obvious. Leadership mattered, so elections mattered. U.S. President Bill Clinton’s decision to press for NATO’s expansion, initially to include the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, shaped a bipartisan consensus on the form Europe’s security would take in the post–Cold War era. But Europe had confidence in the United States and was not fixated on its elections.

The 2000 U.S. presidential elections had dramatic consequences for Europe. The U.S. invasion of Iraq under President George W. Bush played a critical role in undermining support for UK Prime Minister Tony Blair and the moderate wing of the Labour Party.

The 2016 presidential election ended any remaining complacency about U.S. elections. Europeans and their leaders began to actively anticipate the foreign policy consequences of U.S. elections. After Donald Trump’s 2016 electoral victory, Europe found itself on the receiving end of a tariff war and was forced to concede the end of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or Iran nuclear agreement, which it had championed. For those four years, the United Kingdom lost confidence in its U.S. anchor. This came at a time of great domestic vulnerability when it was executing its withdrawal from the European Union.

Europe watched the 2020 elections with trepidation, and for good reason. The 2020 electoral victory of President Joe Biden meant that NATO united and came to the defense of Ukraine, and that the United States deepened its ties to its European allies and the European Union. Any fallout from the U.S. adoption of the Inflation Reduction Act pales in comparison to the havoc that a second Trump term would have wreaked on transatlantic relations.

Today, Europe’s concern for the 2024 elections is existential. So much so that it is now impossible to imagine a return to a world where Europe is either confident or complacent about a U.S. election. 

Already, the U.S. elections are taking their toll on the continent because Europe perceives that they will be uniquely consequential for its future security. There is a pervasive feeling that a reelection of Donald Trump would lead to a significant and potentially irreversible rupture in transatlantic relations, and in the character of U.S. democracy. A changed United States could mean a future in which shared values cease to be a source of common purpose, and the United States and Europe simply go separate ways when their security and economic interests diverge. In material terms, the elections matter for Ukraine, for NATO, for European security, for cooperation on China, for future alignment on economic security policy—the list is long.

Europe’s fate looks much different if Vice President Kamala Harris is elected to be the next U.S. president. A Harris foreign policy would be one defined by shared values, a U.S. commitment to NATO, and to diplomacy. And on a long list of issues, not least climate change, Harris and European policymakers are broadly aligned.

If, on the other hand, Trump is reelected, all bets are off. The far right will be emboldened in the United States and in Europe. State-to-state cooperation on climate change and artificial intelligence will end abruptly. Europe’s need to be a geopolitical power will quickly become all that much more essential. But in the face of an obstreperous United States, those efforts will be harder to achieve.

To be sure, elections are not everything. Cooperation on global challenges will be tough regardless. The United States will continue to be wary of Europe’s regulatory tendencies. Europe will continue to face pressure from the United States to spend more, do more, and work together more regardless of who is next in the White House. Multiple wars, complex global problems, and a United States that is constrained economically but also politically ensure this. However, a Trump victory would likely add chaos and instability and undermine the capacity for the strategic thinking that is essential in today’s world.